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Abstract
This study argues that the best way for Azerbaijan to avoid its oil revenues 
having an adverse effect on its economy, and for the income to be distributed 
in a fair manner to more Azeris, is to ensure the good governance of these 
revenues. The paper examines the state bodies responsible for collecting 
and distributing these monies, before assessing the risk factors involved with 
the current administrative arrangements. Most notably, these include a weak 
legal infrastructure, an absence of effective anti-corruption measures, and an 
underdeveloped independent media and civil society. Based on a critical survey 
of existing legislation and in-depth interviews with government offi cials, NGOs 
and the media, the author argues for specifi c changes to the legal framework. 
The boosting of the potential of civil society and the mass media to monitor the 
process of revenue management, as well as increasing people’s awareness 
that they are entitled to a share of the oil revenues, is also considered crucial 
in reducing the associated risk of the Dutch Disease. Finally, this policy paper 
offers a critical assessment of the role international institutions might play in 
helping the Azerbaijani government maximize the long term benefi ts of its oil 
revenues.
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Executive Summary
The present research concerns some ways of developing an effective pol-
icy to manage the revenues acquired from the development of Azerbaijan’s 
hydrocarbon resources. 
In 2006, Azerbaijan will embark on a full-fi eld development program of two 
gigantic hydrocarbon fi elds: those of Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli and Shah-Deniz. 
Calculations show that the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli contract alone will fetch about 
$170 billion in revenues for the country before 2025, provided that the crude 
price is $45 per barrel. Besides this, in peak years of production (2008-2012) 
the country’s revenues may reach $10-15 billion a year. For a comparison, 
Azerbaijan’s state budget in 2005 was $2.4 billion.
In order to prevent an adverse impact of the revenue windfall on the coun-
try’s economy, and to lower the risk of the economic phenomena of Dutch Dis-
ease,1 the government decided, in late 1999, to set up an Oil Fund. This fund 
will gather together the bulk of oil revenues. However, revenues also come into 
the state budget both in the form of taxes and transfers from the Oil Fund. The 
fi nancing of a number of state programs has now begun via use of Oil Fund 
revenues. 
This research provides a brief description of the situation, involving ways of 
managing the growing oil revenues of both the Oil Fund and the state budget. 
And it looks at the main risks involved in losing any portion of the revenues, 
which would include the fact that:
the government is inexperienced in managing revenue windfalls;
laws are imperfect;
the judiciary is dependent on the executive branch;
the legislature is dependent on the executive branch;
democratic institutions are weak;
civil society is underdeveloped;
independent media are weak.
The author’s research into existing statutory acts pertaining to the manage-
ment of oil revenues and the State Oil Fund, in-depth interviews with govern-
ment offi cials and experts, as well as focus group meetings held with leaders 
of key NGOs and the media all lead to the following suggestions as regards 
1 Dutch disease is an economic theory that holds that a sharp increase in revenues from 
natural resources will deindustrialise a nation’s economy by raising the exchange rate, which 
makes the manufacturing sector less competitive.
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reducing the risk of ineffective usage of the country’s hydrocarbon revenues, 
namely that there is a need:
to modernize the legal framework for managing oil revenues;
to boost the interests of civil society as regards monitoring the process 
of managing oil revenues;
to boost the capacity of civil society and independent media.
Modernization of the legal framework in which the management of oil rev-
enues is taking place can be implemented by way of replacing existing, non-
coordinated legal acts with a special law for the Oil Fund and the managing of 
oil revenues. The law might be based on the following principles:
Parliament’s exclusive decision-making rights as regards spending SO-
FAZ resources;
Parliament’s exclusive decision-making rights on imposing restrictions 
on storage and the placing of SOFAZ resources;
Rejection of the current SOFAZ budget concept, whereby the fund’s as-
sets can also be used to fi nance different state projects and programs;
Distribution of a portion of oil revenues among citizens;
Targeted use of SOFAZ resources;
Establishing a parliamentary commission to observe SOFAZ’s invest-
ment policy;
Having the SOFAZ executive director appointed by parliament, with a 
presidential motion;
Attracting foreign managers to SOFAZ portfolio investment and in con-
nection with locating its assets. 
Boosting civil society’s interests as regards monitoring the process of man-
aging oil revenues is an important factor for the good governing of revenues. A 
government will be more responsible if it is responsive to civil society. Many citi-
zens of the country do not realize that they, too, are entitled to a share in oil and 
gas revenues. Numerous opinion polls reveal that many treat these revenues 
as something belonging to the government elite only. Such a situation can only 
be changed by large-scale and comprehensive campaigns of a cyclical nature, 
ones lasting several years. This research will thus provide recommendations on 
how to organize such a campaign. For instance, one suggestion would be this: 
to dedicate a certain day during the year to different activities with the motto “oil 
revenues belong to all”. On such a day, a talk-show could be organized on a 
popular television channel, special fi lms might be shown by all regional televi-
sion channels, conferences could be held, special posters would be put up in 
streets, pocket calendars might be printed and handed out to people, etc.
In an effort to boost the capacities of civil society and the media, this re-
search suggests that training sessions be given to persons regarding the differ-
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ent aspects of oil contracts and the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative. 
Another suggestion is that annual competitions are held for the best journalistic 
investigations into ways of using oil revenues.
Introduction
Azerbaijan is an oil country. Oil used to be bought from different countries 
long ago. This has been confi rmed by well-known European and Middle East-
ern travelers and historians. The country has experienced several oil booms: 
the fi rst occurred in the fi rst half of the 19th century, while the most recent one is 
going on at the present time.
Starting from 1994, the country has signed 25 PSAs. Although eight of them 
have now been stopped due to exploratory failures, work on other PSAs contin-
ues. Exploration work has revealed the existence of gigantic oil (the Azeri-Chi-
rag-Gunashli fi eld has 5.3 billion barrels of oil) and gas (Shah-Deniz has 700 
billion cubic meters of natural gas) fi elds.
The role the oil sector plays in the country’s economy (not to mention poli-
tics) today is confi rmed by the following indicators for 2005:
the share of the oil sector in GDP was 42%;
the share of oil and oil products in exports was 84%;
the share of the oil sector in total investment was 64%, and in foreign 
investment 87%;
the share of the oil sector in state budget revenues was 40%. 
With the full-fi eld development of the ACG oil fi elds and the Shah-Daniz gas 
condensate fi eld now going ahead, the importance of this resource will grow 
even more. Whereas in 2005 a little over 20 million tons of oil and around 6 bil-
lion cubic meters of gas were produced, in 2010 these indicators are expected 
to reach 60-65 million tons of oil and 15 billion cubic meters of gas.
Therefore, the country is on the threshold of gaining major oil revenues.
Calculations made by the author show that the ACG contract alone will 
fetch between $30 and 20 billion for the country before 2025, depending on the 
crude oil price (calculations of anticipated revenues are based on a price range 
of $15 to 50 per barrel).
What might such huge revenues actually mean for Azerbaijan, though?
•
•
•
•
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1 Oil and Gas Revenues are Only an 
Opportunity
The revenue windfall expected to begin with the development of Azerbai-
jan’s hydrocarbon resources will provide the Azerbaijani people with a historic 
opportunity to lay the foundations for the sustainable economic development of 
the country, a solution to poverty and the formation of a new competitive gen-
eration. Yet this is only an opportunity. It is possible to take it, and make use of it 
- though this opportunity might also be missed, that is, not taken advantage of. 
For the practices of many resource-rich countries show us that not all of them 
have been able to make use of such opportunities! There is a “resource curse” 
notion, which has struck many countries rich in mineral resources.
So the problem facing Azerbaijan is as follows: will there be good gover-
nance of oil and gas revenues? And what does this mean exactly? Of course, 
it is a method of governance whereby revenues will be wisely located, invested 
and spent - and certainly not embezzled. Yet how can we save these revenues 
from suffering at the hands of ineffective governance or embezzlement? Before 
we attempt to answer this question, let’s take a look at where hydrocarbon rev-
enues actually go, who disposes of them and what the risks involved are.
2 State Bodies Gathering Together Oil Revenues 
The main recipients of oil revenues in the country are the State Oil Fund, 
the State Budget and the State Oil Company. Revenues will also go to the State 
Social Protection Fund and a number of state enterprises, banks and other or-
ganizations. All of these are state bodies, so it is very important to ensure that 
good governance exists in all of these locations/bodies.
Revenues of the State Oil Fund are formed by: 
sale of the state share of the profi t oil; 
bonuses;
per-acre payments;
transit fees;
lease
other items.
State Budget oil revenues come from:
taxes taken from the State Oil Company from profi ts;
•
•
•
•
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•
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tax taken from the profi ts made by foreign contractors;
tax taken from the incomes of subcontractors providing services to con-
tractors;
tax taken from the salaries of foreign company staff.
Revenues for the State Oil Company come from:
the independent production and sale of oil;
the production and sale of oil products; 
participating shares for oil contracts;
other sources.
Oil revenues for the State Social Protection Fund come from deductions of 
22% from the salaries of oil company staff and subcontractors dealing with oil 
contracts. While different state companies, banks and other organizations pro-
viding services to oil companies also profi t here.
3 State Body Spending on Oil Revenues 
Oil Fund resources are spent according to presidential decree. This is stipu-
lated by the Oil Fund Regulations, which were approved by presidential decree. 
Oil Fund expenditure has a place in a consolidated budget that has been ap-
proved by parliament. 
Prior to 2006, Oil Fund resources were used for:
Financing the share of SOCAR in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline 
project;
Improving the social status of refugees and IDPs;
Increasing state budget revenues. 
The Oil Fund’s expenditure plan for 2006 envisions: 
a fi nancing of activities aimed at addressing different social and domes-
tic problems of refugees and IDPs – 110 million manats (about $120 
mln);
a share of SOCAR in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project – 38 
million manats (about $42 mln);
2006 state budget (transfers) – 585 million manats (about $641 mln);
a Oguz-Gabala water pipeline construction project  – 90 million manats 
(about $99 mln);
reconstruction of the Samur-Absheron irrigation system  – 37 million 
manats (about $40 mln);
charter capital for the State Investment Company  – 90 million manats 
(about $99 mln);
activities of the State Oil Fund – about 4 million manats (about $4.4 
mln).
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Thus, a little over 954 million manats will be spent in these several areas 
(about $1,046 mln).
Apart from transfers into the state budget, all other expenditures are specifi c 
and have a specifi c addressee. Thus, the money allocated from SOFAZ for:
solutions to refugee problems will be spent by the state committee for 
refugees and IDPs;
the oil pipeline will be spent by BTC Co;
the water pipeline will be spent by the winner of a tender procedure;
reconstruction of the Samur-Absheron irrigation system will also be 
spent by the winner of a tender;
creation of a charter fund will be spent by an investment company; 
activities undertaken by SOFAZ will be kept in the fund’s accounts.
This knowledge of specifi c addressees will make future monitoring and au-
diting of these expenditures a lot easier; yet, at the same time, money trans-
ferred into the state budget (585 million manats) will become spread among 
other budgets and used for resources, so it will be impossible to keep track of 
it; i.e. unspecifi c transfers of oil money into the state budget are diluted and are 
gently distributed to different ministries and government agencies.
The next question is, therefore: how does one go about keeping track of 
this money? Today, such a thing would be possible only by means of a total 
monitoring of all budget expenditures – though this is a more or less impossible 
task; for even the resources of the Chamber of Accounts wouldn’t be suffi cient 
to do this. The Chamber of Accounts conducts inspections in strict accordance 
with an annual program approved by parliament - though this program covers 
only a handful of state agencies and state projects. Indeed, according to the 
Chamber’s reports for 2005, the Chamber managed to keep control of only 
about 8% of state expenditure.
So the best way out of this situation is by stopping open-ended transfers 
into the state budget - and by using oil money to fi nance only specifi c projects, 
especially if we take a look at the proposed principles of the new law on the Oil 
Fund and on related management of oil revenues.
•
•
•
•
•
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4 Risk Factors Associated With the Ineffective 
Management of Resources 
The risk factors associated with ineffective management of oil revenues in 
Azerbaijan are:
the government is inexperienced in managing major revenues;
laws are imperfect;
the judiciary is dependent on the executive branch;
legislature is dependent on the executive branch;
there are no effective tools via which to fi ght corruption;
democratic institutions are overly weak; 
civil society is too weak;
independent media are too weak;
others.
The government’s lack of experience in governing major revenues can be 
explained by the fact that everything was decided by Moscow in Soviet times. 
The local government could not dispose of oil and other products on its own. 
For instance, it had no right to sell national resources on foreign markets, had 
no right to form its own hard currency reserves and, consequently, did not need 
to govern such reserves - all this was taken care of by the central government. 
In addition, the close proximity of the Soviet economy, and its isolation from 
global economic processes, stock and commodity exchanges did nothing to 
‘train’ local specialists as regards making transactions involving securities, fi -
nancial analyses of investment processes, etc. Today, Azerbaijan is trying to 
solve these problems by training its own specialists and via attracting foreign 
managers to manage the assets of the State Oil Fund and hard currency re-
serves of the National Bank.
Imperfect laws. The laws of the country (which gained independence 14 
years ago) have practically been formed anew; and this process was complicat-
ed because the country had to change its development course from a socialist 
and centrally-managed Soviet system to a market-oriented, liberal-democratic 
one. Another diffi culty cam via the fact that, in parallel, a whole team/school of 
lawyers and law-makers needed to be formed in the country. In Soviet times, 
laws were decided upon in Moscow and, of course, it has not been an easy task 
to create, over a short period of time, a system of perfect laws based on com-
pletely different attitudes towards private property and other relations between 
economic players. (Such a situation is characteristic for all post-Soviet repub-
lics.) Ambiguous and unclear defi nitions of certain provisions of laws precondi-
•
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tion arbitrary interpretations of them on the part of government offi cials – which 
then lays the foundation for methods of bribery. Quite often, therefore, laws do 
not meet the requirements of international organizations in terms of transpar-
ency, accountability and other good governance criteria.
on public service;
on state procurement;
on the Chamber of Accounts;
on access to information;
on state secrets;
on fi ghting corruption;
on declarations of income by public offi cers.
Dependence of the judiciary on the executive branch. So far, Azerbaijani 
laws and government traditions do not ensure the independence of the judi-
ciary. Under article 99 of the Azerbaijani Constitution, executive power in the 
Azerbaijani Republic belongs to the president. Also, under article 109 of the 
Constitution, judges of the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court and Appeal 
Courts are appointed by parliament on a presidential motion; while judges of 
all other courts are appointed by the president, who also appoints the country’s 
prosecutor-general with the consent of parliament. In other words, legislative 
realities are such that judges effectively operate under the direct control of the 
presidential administration. The main criterion in such appointing of judges is, 
thus, their loyalty to presidential authority.
Dependence of the legislative branch on the executive one. In the period of 
Azerbaijan’s independence, three parliamentary elections have been held: in 
1995, in 2000 and 2005. All of these elections were marred by major irregulari-
ties and were described by international organizations as being non-free and 
non-democratic. Many politicians and political analysts are convinced that the 
executive branch won these elections after having prepared beforehand lists of 
future members of parliament! The opposition managed to get about 5 per cent 
of seats in the parliament. The process of voting was accompanied by numer-
ous irregularities, as a result of which the country ended up with a parliament 
that always obeyed the executive. For all of these years, the parliament simply 
adopted laws whose drafts had been earlier prepared either by the presidential 
administration or different cabinet ministries. Very rarely were drafts of new 
laws actually initiated by parliament.
Weak mechanisms for fi ghting corruption.  Azerbaijan cannot boast of having 
‘good governance indicators’ at present. In fact, in 2005, Transparency Interna-
tional ranked Azerbaijan 137th-143rd (jointly together with Cameroon, Ethiopia, 
•
•
•
•
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Indonesia, Iraq, Liberia and Uzbekistan) out of 159 countries for a ‘corruption 
perception index’. A high level of corruption in the country was confi rmed in a 
sociological survey recently (May 2004), one commissioned by Transparency 
Azerbaijan, with 1,000 respondents. According to the survey, more than 86.9 
per cent of those polled see the level of corruption in the country as being quite 
high (52.2 per cent) or very high (34.7 per cent).
In the past two years, the government has taken a number of measures to 
reduce corruption in the country:
a law on fi ghting corruption has been adopted;
a state program to fi ght corruption has been adopted;
a law on declarations of incomes for public workers has been adopted;
a state commission to fi ght corruption has been set up;
a department to fi ght corruption has been established within the Pros-
ecutor-General’s Offi ce;
and other measures have also been resorted to.
Punishment fi gures for corruption-related crimes have increased - though 
the fi ght against corruption has not become a priority state policy as yet.
Weak democratic institutions. Democratic traditions in Azerbaijan date back 
to 1918, when, after a revolution in Russia, the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic 
was formed. It existed for only two years. Then, Soviet Russia annexed Azerbai-
jan (again) and established a Bolshevik dictatorship here. The new era of demo-
cratic transformation began after Azerbaijan gained independence in 1991. The 
fi rst election, which was quite close to having democratic standards, was held 
in June 1992, when Abulfaz Elchibay was elected president of the Azerbaijani 
Republic. The fact that the election had broken the Soviet tradition of supervised 
voting and falsifi ed vote counts was confi rmed (at least) by the fact that the 
president got around 59 per cent of votes, while the runner-up got about 35 per 
cent. All subsequent elections in the country were marred by major irregularities, 
though, which were registered by international organizations. The country’s par-
liament, elections to which were held in 1995 and 2000, was actually formed, not 
elected – for the process was managed by the presidential administration. The 
presidential election held in 1993 (early election), 1998 and 2003 were marred 
by certain irregularities that were refl ected in the reports of international organi-
zations, too. It needs to be acknowledged, though, that Heydar Aliyev really did 
have the highest popularity rating in the country (which was also confi rmed by 
numerous sociological surveys). There are more than 50 political parties in the 
country, now, but the vast majority of them are very small-sized. Thus, the condi-
tions of political struggle in the country are far from being democratic ones.
•
•
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Weak civil society organizations. There are about 2,000 non-governmental 
organizations in Azerbaijan, and most are not registered. Until several years 
ago, registering an NGO was an extremely complicated procedure. The situ-
ation has slightly improved over the past two years, however. Existing NGOs 
operate in different areas: human rights, ecology, legal awareness, social sup-
port, etc. The weakness of civil organizations can be mainly explained by the 
fact that they are very still very young, and their fi nancial status is not stable. 
Civil organizations, with only a few exceptions, have yet to become an effective 
instrument for monitoring government operations.
Weakness of the independent media.  There is independent print media in 
the country, being represented by a handful of newspapers. There are many 
more newspapers expressing the opinion of the authorities or the opposition. 
The daily print-run of independent newspapers is negligible, accounting for 
about 0.5 per cent of the capital city’s readership (where there is a population 
of 3m people); while the print-run of the opposition press is slightly bigger, serv-
ing around 2 per cent of the population of Baku. Such low print-run fi gures can 
be explained by the poor purchasing power of the population. Thus, the main 
source of information for the country’s population is that of the six television 
channels, two of which are state-owned, three are owned by people close to 
the authorities, and the one other (private) channel is owned by people who are 
less affi liated to the government but who do come under their infl uence nev-
ertheless. The channel expresses the opinion of the government much more 
frequently than that of the opposition in politically active periods.
According to article 57 of the Constitution, Azerbaijani citizens have the right 
to criticize the work and activities of state bodies and their offi cials, political par-
ties, trade unions, other public organizations, as well as individual citizens. Yet, 
according to the same article, insult and slander cannot be classed as criticism. 
Legal norms - where explanations as regards insult and slander can be sought 
after - are contained in articles 148 and 147 respectively. Censorship in the 
country is legally banned. According to article 6 of the Law on Freedom of Infor-
mation (adopted by the Azerbaijani parliament on June 19, 1998), state censor-
ship of the media is unacceptable; and the unacceptability of media censorship 
is confi rmed by article 7 of the Mass Media Law. In practice, however, the presi-
dential administration enforces unoffi cial censorship onto pro-government and 
independent media. Opposition newspapers criticize the government system-
atically; and independent newspapers do so quite often as well. Nonetheless, 
no matter what types of scathing article they publish, it does not perturb the 
14
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authorities too much – for there is practically no reaction to critical articles, and 
this signifi cantly weakens the role of the media in the fi ght against corruption. 
Opposition and independent newspapers also publish articles about corruption 
quite often, though in many cases these articles are not a product of in-depth 
journalistic investigation. Besides this, their readership amongst the electorate 
is insignifi cant. Television channels broadcast programs about corruption very 
rarely, and even those few that are televised are selective. And there have been 
many cases where journalists have been punished via a charge of slander.
5 Some Ways of Reducing the Risks
Suggested ways of reducing oil revenue losses (discussed above) do not 
cover all possible measures via which to improve monitoring effectiveness - for 
such measures are likely to have been designed on the basis of current legisla-
tion and decision-making practices. (It should also not be ruled out that some 
of the proposed measures will have been implemented by the time this policy 
paper comes out.)
The author’s analysis of existing legal requirements pertaining to the man-
agement of oil revenues and of the activities of the State Oil Fund along with 
interviews with government offi cials/experts and focus group discussions with 
leaders of key NGOs and the media, give rise to the following ideas as regards 
reducing the risk of ineffective hydrocarbon revenue usage. It is suggested that 
there is:
modernization of the legal framework for the managing of oil revenues;
a boosting of the capacities of civil society and independent media;
and a boosting of the interests of citizens when it comes to oil rev-
enues.
5.1 Modernizing the legal framework for managing oil revenues
5.1.1 Adoption of the law on the Oil Fund and oil revenue expenditure
The activities of SOFAZ and policies relating to the spending of oil proceeds 
are regulated by the following statutory documents:
Presidential decree dated December 29, 1999 establishing the State 
Oil Fund;
Regulations of SOFAR approved via a presidential decree dated De-
cember 29, 2000;
•
•
•
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Rules of storing, placing and managing hard currency reserves of the 
State Oil Fund. The rules were approved by a presidential decree dated 
June 19, 2001;
Rules for developing and executing the annual budget of the State Oil 
Fund, approved by presidential decree dated September 12, 2001. 
Subsequently, the rules were amended, twice: on February 7, 2003 and 
March 1, 2005;
The “Long-term strategy for managing oil revenues”. This strategy was 
approved by a presidential decree on September 27, 2004.
In previous research, we noted the important provisions of these documents 
- and the norms in them that could serve to increase the risks inherent in inef-
fective expenditure of oil revenues.
Improvement of the legal framework within which oil revenue management 
occurs might be implemented via replacing the existing, uncoordinated legal 
acts with a special new law on the Oil Fund and on the handling of oil rev-
enues.
The law should refl ect the following principles: 
Parliament’s exclusive decision-making rights with regard to spending 
SOFAZ resources;
Parliament’s exclusive decision-making rights on imposing restrictions 
on storage and placement of SOFAZ resources;
Rejection of the current SOFAZ budget concept, whereby the fund’s as-
sets can also be used to fi nance different state projects and programs;
Distributing a portion of oil revenues among the people; in doing this, it 
is necessary to ensure that citizens get their fair share of oil revenues; 
Targeted use of SOFAZ resources;
Establishing a parliamentary commission to monitor SOFAZ’s invest-
ment policies; 
Having the SOFAZ executive director appointed by parliament, via 
presidential motion;
Attracting foreign managers to the SOFAZ portfolio investment, and 
getting their help when locating its assets.
The decision-making monopoly of parliament with regard to spending 
SOFAZ’s resources. The use of this principle in the new law would mean a 
transfer of decision-making rights as regards spending SOFAZ resources from 
the president to parliament. According to the existing Regulations of SOFAZ, 
the spending of oil revenues comes via annual presidential decrees on prior-
ity expenditure directions (paragraph 4.1.). The transfer of this right to parlia-
ment, though, would enable decision-making to occur via a broader spectrum 
of stakeholders, i.e. as parliament represents not only different political forces 
but also many other sectors (business, education, health, etc.), regions, ethnic 
groupings, etc.
•
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A Parliamentary monopoly as regards restrictions on the storage and plac-
ing of SOFAZ resources. Today, decisions about storage and SOFAZ resource 
placements are made by the SOFAZ executive director on the basis of rules for 
keeping, locating and managing the hard currency resources of the State Oil 
Fund (which have been approved by the president). The new law should refl ect 
all the norms pertaining to these rules.
    Rejecting the concept of the SOFAZ budget, which, in addition to expen-
diture relating to the fund’s current activities, also contains spending on differ-
ent state projects and programs. According to the above-mentioned rules for 
developing and executing the annual program (budget) of the State Oil Fund, 
the fund’s expenditure, in addition to expenses associated with the fund’s cur-
rent activities, also envisions expenditure on various state projects and pro-
grams. Dealings as regards the fund’s expenditure, according to the said rules, 
is performed jointly with the Finance Ministry. Yet it might be appropriate to 
exempt SOFAZ from having to make forecasts about spending on such proj-
ects/programs; for this work needs to done within the framework of a single 
budgetary process. 
Distribution of a portion of oil revenues among citizens. A high level of oil 
revenues for a number of years and with peak levels of hydrocarbon produc-
tion will make it possible to distribute a portion of them among the people. In 
doing so, it is necessary to ensure that all citizens are entitled to a share of 
such revenues. By allocating funds towards, say, fi nding a solution to the social 
problems of refugees and IDPs, the government is actually violating the rights 
of other citizens to a natural form of wealth which might be considered common 
to all. Such a policy would also lead to the growing discontent of other citizens, 
and perhaps confl ict. Such confl icts do exist, in fact, though are not widespread 
(even though the level of discontent has been on the increase lately). Calcula-
tions show that with a world market price of oil at $50 per barrel, the country’s 
revenues could reach $15 billion in 2009. If $8 billion is divided among citizens, 
this would mean that each persons would get $1,000 – which is good money for 
a country in which almost 40% of the population live below the poverty line! The 
annual income of these people does not exceed $600, so one can understand 
how glad such people would be. Also in this connection, the attitudes of many 
people towards oil contracts would then change – for sociological surveys have 
shown that many see them merely as a means of self-enrichment for the gov-
ernment elite.
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Targeted use of SOFAZ resources. The implementation of this principle 
would mean the rejection of meaningless transfers from the fund to the state 
budget. Such transfers become negligible in total budget expenditure, and it 
is impossible to keep track of them afterwards. Yet targeted use of resources 
used for specifi c projects would enable one to monitor how this money was be-
ing spent.
Establishment of a parliamentary commission to observe SOFAZ’s invest-
ment policy. According to the Regulations on SOFAZ, there is an Observation 
Council that is formed by the president. This council has to be made up of rep-
resentatives of the government, parliament and public organizations. Although 
three years have passed since the passing of this law, civil society representa-
tives have yet to be included in the Council. Under its regulations, the fund is 
not accountable to parliament, which means that discussion of the fund’s work 
is limited. When forming the parliamentary commission to monitor the fund’s 
investment activities, the experience of Norway was used: in Norway, this com-
mission consists of MPs representing opposition parties. Yet even if the com-
mission had a mixed composition, it would still have a positive effect.
Appointment of the SOFAZ executive director by parliament, on a presiden-
tial motion. According to the Regulations on SOFAZ, the executive director is 
now appointed by the president, i.e. as is the case with ministers; though as re-
gards the nature of the work, this position is similar to that of the National Bank 
chairman, i.e. who is appointed by parliament via a presidential motion.
Attracting foreign managers towards SOFAZ portfolio investments, and the 
locating of its resources in foreign banks. This was taken into account by exist-
ing rules with regard to storing, placing and managing the State Oil Fund’s hard 
currency resources. Such norms should also be present in the new law.
5.1.2 Alternatives to the adoption of a new law
If there is stiff resistance to the adoption of the new law, or if its adoption is 
delayed, it might be worth - as an alternative to adoption of such a law - amend-
ing the above-mentioned legal acts pertaining to SOFAZ and to the manage-
ment of oil revenues. The essence of, and a list of proposed amendments could 
be defi ned on the basis of the previous study, i.e. which revealed the loopholes 
in the said statutory acts.  
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5.1.3 Improving the legal acts pertaining to public service
We have now looked at a number of drawbacks in the existing laws, name-
ly:
on public service;
on state procurement;
on the Chamber of Accounts;
on access to information;
on state secrets;
on fi ghting corruption;
on declaration of incomes for public offi cers.
The elimination of drawbacks in these laws would lower the risk of corrup-
tion at the stage of expenditure of oil revenues. 
5.2 Boosting the potential of civil society and the mass media
Measures aiming at both quantitative and qualitative growth for NGOs are 
appropriate for the country at the present time – yet existing procedures for the 
registration of NGOs are too complicated, and need to be simplifi ed. It is im-
portant to amend the current law on public associations and funds or to adopt 
a new law dealing with non-commercial organizations. The existing law does 
not provide for the establishment of any non-commercial organizations other 
than NGOs and foundations. For instance, an attempt to establish a non-profi t 
Think Tank could not materialize, which is why such institutes are established 
in Azerbaijan in the form of Ltd. Companies.  It does not make sense to set up 
an NGO due to ‘membership issue’ concerns. 
Even if the existing law is left unchanged, then at least the legal acts of the 
Justice Ministry pertaining to registration will have to be reconsidered, for they 
do make the registration procedure extremely complicated and leave room for 
ministry offi cials to deny or delay the registration of an NGO. And there are 
numerous provisions in these acts that are meaningless and/or with no founda-
tion.
There are still cases when ministry offi cials consult presidential adminis-
tration ones on whether to register an NGO that has taken a critical stance 
towards incumbent authorities. For example, Transparency International–Azer-
baijan was registered only in late December 2005, i.e. registration was granted 
fi ve years after the organization was set up; and it also happened only with the 
assistance of the US ambassador.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Boosting the potential of civil society and, more importantly, NGOs dealing 
with the monitoring of oil revenues might be possible by providing training and 
having roundtable discussions among relevant persons. 
Such measures are part of the action plan of the Coalition of 67 Azerbaijani 
NGOs, “To Improve Transparency in the Extractive Industry”, for 2006-2007. 
The Coalition was established in May 2004 and aims to monitor oil revenues 
within the EITI framework. (Azerbaijan is one of the EITI pilot countries.) The 
establishment and work of the Coalition are a good example of NGO public 
policy in Azerbaijan. The Coalition is also a signatory to an MoU signed on No-
vember 24, 2004 between the government, 22 petroleum companies and the 
Coalition proper. This Memorandum signaled the launch of the EITI in Azerbai-
jan, as a result of which the country’s revenues and all payments made by pe-
troleum companies become transparent. The Coalition also strives to improve 
public awareness of oil contracts and country revenues, and to conduct ‘round-
tables’ and training sessions for NGOs and the media. The Coalition’s plan for 
the next two years has been prepared with the participation of the author of this 
present research, who happens to be the coordinator of the Coalition. The plan 
proposes the implementation of different projects, including projects concern-
ing such areas as:
increasing public interest and capacity,
boosting the capacities of the Coalition,
improving legislation in order to advance the cause of transparency in 
the extractive industry, 
cooperating with other countries and public associations involved in the 
EITI, 
cooperating with international fi nancial institutions, 
exercising control over the use of extractive industry revenues, 
actually increasing oil revenues (by way of reducing ineffective expen-
diture).
It is also important to ensure that NGOs operate in a coordinated fashion 
because, over the past few years, several NGOs have been engaged in issues 
of increasing budget transparency and monitoring expenditures in different ar-
eas (education, health, etc.).
The focus groups and in-depth interviews with heads of a number of media 
outlets and journalistic associations held by the author of the research give im-
portant signposts as regards being able to improve journalists’ awareness of oil 
contracts, anticipated revenues, legal acts pertaining to the management of oil 
revenues and government expenditure of such revenues. Alongside this, focus 
groups and interviews show that it is also vital to make journalists more inter-
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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ested in monitoring the spending of oil revenues while carrying out journalistic 
investigations. Therefore, the following measures could be instrumental in im-
proving the effectiveness of the media in the area of monitoring oil revenues:
training journalists;
providing a series of lectures at journalistic faculties;
conducting a special roundtable for the editors of leading mass media;
arranging competitions for the best journalistic investigations into how 
oil revenues are spent;
arranging competitions for the best short fi lm;
creating special documentary fi lms, and broadcasting them on televi-
sion channels.
All of these measures would certainly enhance the potential of the more ac-
tive part of Azerbaijani society with regard to publicizing the issues.
5.3 Boosting citizens’ interest in oil revenues
Many citizens do not yet fully realize that they, too, are entitled to a share of 
the oil and gas revenues. Opinion polls show that people treat these revenues 
as something belonging to the government elite, not to ordinary people. The 
reason for this is that people do not know enough about oil contracts, about 
how much the country is earning now, how much it will earn in the future, and 
how this money is being spent.
This situation can only be changed by large-scale and comprehensive cam-
paigns with a cyclical nature, and which would last for several years. It might be 
worth conducting public activities capable of attracting the public’s attention to 
the theme of oil revenue spending. This could be done with the aid of the mass 
media and via contacts with the broad public. For instance, one suggestion (as 
already mentioned) is to dedicate a specifi c day (or week) in one year to dif-
ferent activities under the motto “oil revenues belong to all”. On such a day (or 
week), the following activities could be done: 
a talk-show could be organized on a popular television channel;
special fi lms could be shown by all regional television channels;
conferences could be held;
special posters could be put up in the streets;
pocket calendars could be printed and given to people; 
special books, brochures and booklets could be printed and distribut-
ed;
other activities.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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•
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Boosting civil society’s interest in monitoring the process of managing oil 
revenues is an important factor with regard to the good handling of revenues, 
for a government will be more responsible if it is aware of civil society.
6 Anticipated Diffi culties, and Ways of 
Overcoming Them 
6.1 Adopting the Law on the Oil Fund, and managing oil revenues
Transfer of presidential powers to parliament
The principles of the new law proposed in paragraph 4.1 deal with presiden-
tial powers. The suggestion here is to hand presidential powers concerning the 
spending of oil fund resources over to the parliament. What will the president’s 
reaction be? Mostly likely, he will be opposed to the move, but he might also 
treat the suggestion positively.
The president will almost certainly take a negative stance towards the hand-
over of such powers to parliament, for such powers are an important compo-
nent of his political authority. Being able to use such a resource, the president 
can easily deal with different waves of public disquiet about issues, or solve 
problems via emergency-situation fi nancing. And the president effectively con-
trols the current parliament: the opposition is too weak, so the ruling party has 
absolute power in it. This factor alone could prompt the president to succumb 
to the pressure of those politicians who are urging him to hand over powers to 
parliament. 
What’s more, the president may be tempted by the idea that such a hand-
over of power would relieve him of the responsibilities of decision-making, al-
though he would still have the ability to have any decision adopted by parlia-
ment. In other words, the same result could be achieved without there being 
any visible damage to democratic principles. 
How strong are the positions of the president’s confi dantes and consultants 
who are in favor of giving parliament the right to dispose of oil revenues? The 
analysis done by the author shows that there are several people in the presi-
dent’s entourage who would agree with such a move - though the vast majority 
of his assistants are ardent supporters of authoritarianism and the unlimited 
power of the president in many issues, including anything that has to do with 
oil revenues. 
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What can be done, therefore? What instruments of persuasion and pres-
sure does civil society and the media have? How effective can opposition activi-
ties be? And is it possible to count on the assistance of international institutions 
with regard to such issues?
The situation in the country is such that the efforts of international institu-
tions, the World Bank, the IMF and others might prove to be most effective. It 
was persistent recommendations coming from these institutions that eventually 
yielded fruit: i.e. the State Oil Fund was established. And it is also thanks to 
these institutions that changes were made to the law on the budgetary process, 
when the Oil Fund expenditure became part of a consolidated budget.
Of course, it would be wrong to deny that the media, civil society and politi-
cal parties can also have an impact - for such an idea would get major support 
from opposition MPs, and others. Many MPs would be interested in acquiring 
powers to dispose of oil revenues. For all such bodies to get to support the idea 
of handing over expenditure powers to parliament, some work must, neverthe-
less, occur in their regard, i.e. via roundtables, publications, analytical reviews, 
etc.
Rejecting the current budget concept of SOFAZ 
Rejection of the SOFAZ budget concept (which, in addition to expenses re-
lated to the Fund itself, also envisions expenses on different state projects and 
programs) will come from the president’s readiness to hand over his powers to 
dispose of the fund’s resources to parliament. Yet even if the president decides 
not to do this, it will still be possible to give up the existing concept. To do so, it is 
necessary to put oil revenue-based expenditure on different state projects and 
programs onto a list containing all other state budget expenditures, and specify 
the exact funding source. By doing so, the government would ensure that a 
concept of forming a state expenditure plan is observed. This work could be 
vested only in the Ministry of Finance. The Oil Fund would still be left to perform 
its functions of placing and storing resources and making portfolio investments; 
and, under such circumstances, the Oil Fund’s budget would then only include 
expenses regarding its own operations.
Distribution of a portion of oil revenues among citizens.
This idea will not go down well with some ministry administrations or the 
National Bank. Some of them (especially the National Bank) would be wary 
of the macroeconomic repercussions of such a move - while others will worry 
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about the subsequent reduction in oil revenue expenditure, which would mean 
less money for the ministries obtaining such resources under different programs 
and projects. Yet involved persons will have to understand that oil revenue ex-
penditure through the budget or via distribution to citizens basically means the 
same thing from the standpoint of increasing cash circulation; the difference is 
that, in one case, this is done by citizens, while, in the other, by government of-
fi cials (who also manage to misappropriate a portion of this money!).
For the president, such an idea may seem attractive because his team 
would be able to start a good PR campaign - which may come in handy ahead 
of the 2008 presidential election.
Targeted use of SOFAZ resources
Who might oppose this? 
Direct transfers from the Oil Fund into the state budget reduce tensions for 
the state bodies responsible for budget revenues - and these, of course, are the 
Ministry of Taxation and the State Customs Committee. The Finance Ministry, 
which is responsible for the drafting of a subsequent year’s budget, feels more 
at ease if there is an opportunity to take required amounts from the Oil Fund; so 
this ministry, too, will also oppose the principle. Other opponents may include 
major state companies that are large taxpayers – for with Oil Funds being trans-
ferred into the state budget, delayed payments of (their) taxes might not be so 
noticeable to the powers-that-be. And, in fact, a lot of state bodies are interest-
ed in Oil Fund transfers because, with this situation, they are likely to receive a 
portion of them. Other supporters of the idea of non-specifi c transfers entering 
the state budget also include those who get their salaries from the state budget 
- and, with this situation, it is easy to convince ordinary citizens that the existing 
practice is correct and is socially-orientated. 
The president, nonetheless, will probably stick to the practice of the last few 
years, i.e. when specifi c amounts were transferred from SOFAZ into the state 
budget; for this practice ensures the stability of budget revenues.
What can be done in such circumstances? How can the president eventu-
ally be persuaded to give up the idea of non-specifi ed transfers into the state 
budget? How is it possible to convince ordinary people that the seeming so-
cial ‘orientation’ of such transfers, fi rst of all, breaches the principle of equal 
entitlement for all citizens (whether public workers, refugees, etc.) as regards 
oil revenues - and, secondly, creates risks of oil revenues being embezzled by 
government offi cials? 
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There is one effective remedy: educational and explanatory work with citi-
zens and those in the state administration who might, potentially, become al-
lies. Of course, explanatory work must fi rst of all be held with representatives 
of the other branches of power, namely the judiciary and legislative bodies. It 
will be a lot easier to fi nd allies there than in the executive branch. However, 
the author of the present research does know a number of high-ranking offi cials 
who would unconditionally be in favor of suspending non-specifi c transfers of 
SOFAZ money into the state budget.
Establishing a parliamentary commission to monitor SOFAZ investment 
policies 
The establishment of such a commission puts the executive branch ‘in the 
hot seat’ at all times and in all countries! But this is what is required by democ-
racy and in the interests of reducing the risks of losing natural resource rev-
enues. The question is, then: who could act as an ally given the establishment 
of the parliamentary commission? There will be both overt and covert allies 
– and also non-allies - in other bodies; and there will be some in the executive 
branch too.
Appointing the SOFAZ executive director by parliament, on a presidential 
motion.
Here, we can express the same suppositions as above. The president will 
perhaps be less inclined to agree with this principle because he has the right 
(established via presidential decree) to appoint the executive director. Yet there 
are several arguments which might convince him to give up the existing prac-
tice. First of all, the right of the president to personally appoint the SOFAZ head 
is rather dubious; while, secondly, the possession of such a right means that 
the president has a share of responsibility for possible mistakes made in the 
managing of oil revenues.
Possibilities for attracting foreign managers to portfolio investments and the 
placement of SOFAZ assets.
This principle is unlikely to have any major opponents because many peo-
ple understand that this is a necessary measure, something explained by the 
fact that Azerbaijan does not yet have enough experience with regard to the 
independent management of revenue windfalls. 
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6.2 Improving the potential of civil society organizations and the 
media, and citizens’ interests in oil revenues and expenditure 
The main problem in this area is fi nancial. The cost of activities listed in 
section 4depends on the number and nature of activities (roundtables, training 
sessions, journalistic competitions, short fi lms, special TV programs, etc.) and 
the number of areas they cover. The more money is spent, the higher the effect. 
(Though we also have to keep it in mind that, starting from a certain amount, the 
effectiveness will start declining in spite of a growing expenditure.) 
Is it possible to expect obstacles on the part of the authorities, therefore? 
This is unlikely to happen, especially if these activities are carried out by the 
NGO Coalition (mentioned above), which is the government’s partner in the 
EITI.
6.3 The role of international institutions 
International fi nancial institutions such as the WB, IMF, EBRD, ADB, as 
well as the European commission and development agencies from a number 
of leading countries (such as USAID, DFID, etc) have been playing an impor-
tant role in facilitating the country’s shift towards being a democratic society 
and liberal economy. By providing technical and fi nancial assistance, they have 
actually acted as partners of the government for many reforms. Although this 
relationship is not always smooth, and is at times even tense, the country is 
undergoing reform, slowly but surely.
The role of international institutions and different international and national 
NGOs in developing civil society in Azerbaijan is important. Thus, all this leaves 
hope that international institutions will help both the government and civil soci-
ety organizations with regard to ensuring that there is good governance of oil 
revenues.
The roles played by international institutions can make the good governance 
of oil revenues easier, though they would cover quite an area. Assistance from 
international institutions could come in the form of:
technical assistance to the government and civil society organizations;
fi nancial assistance to civil society organizations.
The NGO Coalition of Azerbaijan intends to conduct a roundtable, attended 
by representatives of the Oil Fund and international fi nancial institutions, to 
•
•
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discuss key principles of the new law for the Oil Fund and with regard to the 
handling of oil revenues.
7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
An analysis of the situation surrounding the management of oil revenues 
and of government policy being implemented in this area shows us that there 
is room for improving management by means of reducing the risk of losing 
portions of such revenues. These reserves can be overseen and protected via 
the country’s adopting a new law for the Oil Fund and for managing petroleum 
revenues, and also by stepping up the activities of civil society. However, every 
suggestion has its supporters and opponents – though many persons are not 
fi rm in their convictions, so it is possible to win people over from the other camp. 
In other words, the degree of success will depend on how thought-through the 
action plan is, who implements it, and what fi nances will be involved.
Some of the recommendations made by the author of this Policy Paper have 
already been included in the Action Plan of the Azerbaijan NGO Coalition. Also, 
approval has come from a number of international donors who are involved in 
fi nancing different aspects of the plan. And there are reasons to believe that the 
MoU signed on November 24, 2004, between the government commission, oil 
companies and the NGO Coalition, will go to create a constructive environment 
for the discussion of many recommendations.
